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A Tortuous Search for Justice: Notes on the Kashmir
Conflict
Aparna Rao
Institut fi.ir V olkerkunde
Universitat zu Koln

Very few sociological or anthropological studies
have been devoted so far to the Kashmir Valley (for
exceptions see Madan 1989, Sanyal 1979). Numerous
publications exist, however, on its recent history and
politics, with the "Kashmir conflict" being focused on
from a variety of political perspectives (cf. Bose 1997,
Ganguly 1997, Gauhar 1998, Qureshi 1999, Rahman
1996, Schofield 1997 for some major recent studies).
The following preliminary observations seek to address
this conflict by briefly considering certain aspects of
public discourse and specific elements in the
ideologisation and instrumentalisation of a more general
search for justice in the Valley of Kashmir.
July 13 1988, often considered to mark the
beginning of the Kashmir conflict, marks only the
beginning of a new phase in a movement which began
in the 1920s; it augured the transition from a largely
peaceful movement to a rather desperate armed struggle.
This movement was referred to by Chaudhari Ghulam
Abbas of Jammu in his presidential address to the
Muslim Conference party in October 1935, when he
appealed to the non-Muslims of Jammu and Kashmir to
join the Valley Muslims in their fight for "social
justice." Since then this movement has taken many,
often apparently contradictory, forms. The idioms it has
been couched in by its various protagonists, as also by
its opponents, have also varied. The stereotyped, though
emotionally charged metaphors used have been those of
"nationalism" (Kashmiri, Indian), "identity" (Kashmiri),
"Muslim unity" (Kashmir and Pakistan), "Islamic
fundamentalism" (Pakistani), and "secularism" (Indian).
While in the name of nationalism and secularism every
determined political attempt to deal with the key issue
of justice has been nipped in the bud by the Indian state,
there has to date never been a let-up in Pakistani
propaganda in the name of Islam and the true place of
Kashmiris, as Muslims, in a Muslim (e.g. Pakistani)
state. For most vocal Kashmiris, the solution has been
perceived as lying in "self-determination" linked to the
·
concept of a specific identity .
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Identity and Politics-The Beginnings
The concept of a distinct Kashmiri identity
(kashmiriyat) evolved in the 1930s when a movement,
explicitly involving both the Muslim and Hindu
intelligentsia, began against feudal-cum-colonial rule.
The idea of a discrete Kashmiri citizenship goes back
even earlier to the 1920s 1, when agitating Kashmiri
Hindus forced the Government to formally define "State
subjects." Although a tiny minority, certain families
had over the centuries come to enjoy a near monopoly
in the State's administration and were highly perturbed
at being increasingly eased out of these positions of
power by immigrant Punjabis, familiar with Urdu,
which had replaced Persian as the official language.
They now raised the issue of so-called "state" (mulki)
and "non-state" (ghair mulki) subjects in order to
counter the (Hindu Dogra) Maharaja Hari Singh's (19251952) systematic favoring of Hindus and Sikhs from
Jammu, Poonch, what is now Azad Kashmir and parts
of pre-partition Punjab. In 1927 yet another law was
passed defining "hereditary state subjects" and those not
covered by this definition could neither hold public
office, nor buy land. Even after this, however, most
government jobs were largely filled, not by Kashmiris,
but by Dogras from the Jammu area. Hari Singh's
relations with Kashmiri Muslims was even worse.
Although he was far from secular, he appeared at the
I The question of locals and non-locals was a long standing
issue, and as early as 1912 the government distinguished
between "local" animal husbanders, who had lived and
migrated within the state's borders for at least one
generation -and "foreigners" who were considered
undesirable new migrants (C.S . 1914a: 191 4b; 191 4c);
pleas from local Gujar ("Desi Gujari") notwithstanding
(e.g. Imam Din 1924), selected grazing areas were closed to
migratory herds owned by non-Kashmiri. By 1920 these
measures were considered inadequate to curb further
migration into Kashmir from the west, and a formal
notification was passed prohibiting the entry of
"foreigner" herders into the state's territories (C.S. 1914d).
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time to have less strained relations with non-Kashmiri
Muslims. Thus, for example, large numbers of soldiers
were recruited from the Muslim Sandan and Sudhan
communities of Mirpur and Poonch respectively
-albeit under the command of Hindu Dogra officerswhile no Kashmiri Muslim could legally even carry
firearms. However, corporate socio-political
consciousness among Kashmiri Muslims already had a
tradition of roughly seventy years (e.g. Ishaq Khan
1998), with the first strikes and revolts in Srinagar
against intolerable working conditions and grossly
exploitative taxation dating back to 1847, just one year
after the British sold the territory of Kashmir to the
Dogra chieftain Gulab Singh.
The 1920s and 1930s were a period of intense
political ferment in Jammu and Kashmir (for Ladakh see
van Beek 1998): A movement began for the
improvement of the conditions of Muslims and for
greater religious and political freedom. In 1929-1930 the
Majlis-e Ahrar-e lslam-e Hind, an organization fighting
British imperialism was founded in Lahore and soon
after organized demonstrations in Kashmir. Parallel to
this stream of explicitly Muslim identity ran another,
representing economic and non-religious identity; the
latter's concerns were voiced by several organizations,
such as the Gujar-lat Conference, 2 which succeeded in
1927 in getting all sedentary Gujar in Jammu and
Kashmir recognized as "state subjects". Four years later
all nomadic Gujar of the area (cf. Rao and Casimir
1985, Rao 1999) also achieved this status . It was
against this backdrop that in 1931 the "Kashmir
Agitation" began with a series of demonstrations lasting
several weeks. They ended in November 1931 with the
Maharaja setting up the Glancy Commission to look
into the grievances of various communities.
Although to the south of the Valley religion had
always played a major role in politics, in the Valley
religious sentiments, perceived of as opposed to those
of kashmiriyat, never had much impact. Till the early
2oth century there was no religious association in the
Valley and when around 1925 the Anjuman-e Ahl-e
Hadith, with Wahabi leanings, was set up in Srinagar it
met with opposition from most local Muslims. Hari
Singh's misrule coupled with the general subcontinental trend of the period towards
"communalisation" had, however, encouraged affiliation
along religious lines, and gradually Hindus and
Muslims formed their respective associations. In an
attempt to channel popular anger and discontent along
more coherent, non-parochial and explicitly political
lines the Muslim Conference was formed in 1932, with
Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah, a Kashmiri as .President,

Ghulam Abbas from Jammu as General Secretary and a
number of well known Kas hmiri Hindus as members .
Several promine nt Gujar and other non-Kas hmiri
M uslims espec ially from areas south (e.g . Jammu) and
west (e. g. Mirpur) of the Valley also joined . In sp ite of
its name, this organi zation had sec ular obj ect ives and
aimed to fight the oppress iv e regime in Jamm u and
Kas hmi r. Soon, however, Sheikh Abdu ll ah 's stress on
secularism and also certain sectarian differences led to a
split, and notably to Yusuf Shah, the then Minvai z of
Kashmir, leaving the organizat ion .
In 1936, partly as a reaction to the still pre vailin g
religious polarization but partly becaus e Sheikh
Abdullah appeared too socialistic and radical to many, a
regional Congress Party3 was organized in Jammu and,
aga in both Kashmiri and non-Kashmiri, Muslims and
Hindus joined it.4 In 1936-37 the ?raja Sabha, the first
at least nominal peoples' representation , was
inaugurated by the M aharaja, and in 1944 there were
partial elections to this body . In the mean-time another
semi-political organization, the Anjuman-e Mushaekh,
had come up; most of its me mbe rs were loc a l or
regional Muslim spiritual leaders-both Kashmiri and
non-Kashmiri. In 1939 the Muslim Conference was
turned into the National Conference (NC) with an
explicitly secular and socialist manifesto. By this time
close links had been established between the NC and the
larger sub-continental struggle for independencenotably the Indian National Congress. This in turn led
many-including Ghulam Abbas-to break away from
the NC and revive the Muslim Conference in 1941 .
Most who left were, like Ghulam Abbas, Muslims
from south of the Valley. They lived in a Hindu
majority area and much more than the Muslims of the
Valley, who lived in a Muslim majority area, they
perhaps feared being politically swamped by the Indian
National Congress, which they perceived as representing
a Hindu India.
By 1947 there were thus various well formed
streams of identity in Jammu and Kashmir as a whole.
In the Valley feelings of Kashmiri identity rather than
identity along religious lines dominated. This was clear
when the Muslim Conference lost out in popularity to
the NC even during Hindu feudal rule. With the decolonizing of South Asia these identities were now ,
logically enough, paired with the concept of selfdetermination. The latter, conceived of unequivocally as
3 At this stage this local Congress was not recognised by

Muslim, since in the entire area Gujar and Jat were Muslim
(some of the latter were also Ahmadiya). At the time this
was also one of the few major rural-based political
movements in the region. Within Jammu and Kashmir the
Gujar-Jat Collference was formed in 1935.

the Indian National Congress.
4several Gujar and Bakkarwal joined this because they felt
more comfortable in a party which was not numerically
dominated by Kashmiris. Similar reasons led many of them
to be involved later with the Praja Sabha. By doing so they
demonstrated their willingness to compromi se and cooperate with the state, while nevertheless being part of a
· movement of protest. This strategy, commonly resorted to
among "minorities" in many societies, remains an oft
misunderstood and misinterpreted hallmark of the Guj ar and
Bakkarwal in Jammu and Kashmir.
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2 Although not explicitly Islamic, all members were

independence, was brought up, first and foremost, by
Hari Singh, the last Hindu Maharaja.

De -Co lo nizati o n, Partiti on and the Conflict
In 194 7 there were roughly 500 princely states in
South As ia governed accordin g to the principle of
"paramountcy ", i.e. the ass urance that the British would
defend them against all foreign invasions. With the
independence of British India this principle became
irrelevant and these states were given the option of
·acceding to either India, or Pakistan, or of remaining
independent and managing their own defense. Most
decided to join either Pakistan or India, but there were a
few exceptions. Hyderabad's Muslim ruler and a largely
H indu population, Jodhpur's Hindu ruler and mostly
Hindu subjects, Kashmir's
Hindu ruler and an
overwhelmingly Muslim population wanted to continue
as independent rulers.s
Jammu and Kashmir had for many centuries
entertained close trade and intellectual links with Punjab
(both western and eastern, now in Pakistan and India
respectively) and other areas in these two countries.
Hence Hari Singh approached the future rulers of both
these states-to-be with proposals that would guarantee
him his throne and power. In July 1947 while the
Muslim Conference urged him to join Pakistan, India
did not respond, largely because Jawaharlal Nehru was a
personal friend of the Maharaja's arch enemy Sheikh
Mohammad Abdullah, who had been leading the "Quit
Kashmir" movement against Hari Singh since May
1946. Hari Singh now entered into a "standstill
agreement" with Pakistan. Shortly thereafter, however,
a number of events took place that were to drastically
impinge on this agreement:
1. An armed revolt erupted in Poonch in summer
1947 primarily by local Sudhans, aided by Pashtuns
from the North West Frontier Province and actively
supported by officers of the new Pakistani army. This
rebellion was, however, not couched in terms of
re li gious affiliations, and indeed the commanding
officer, Mohammad Zaman Kiani, had been a high
ranking officer in the patently secular Indian National
Army led by Subhas Chandra Bose (Bose 1997).
2. The influx south of the Valley of hundreds of
thousands of Hindu and Sikh refugees fleeing the
horrendous atrocities in western Punjab and the North
West Frontier Province was seized upon by members of
the locally well organized militant Hindu fundamentalist
Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS) to massacre just

5 Much threatening, bargaining and blackmailing
accompanied the delineation of the Indo-Pakistan
boundary. Well known cases are those of Junagadh and
Manavadar, both of which acceded to ·Pakistan, and of the
Hindu Maharaja of Bikaner (with his mainly Hindu
subjects) who threatened to join Pakistan ra ther than India
were his demands not complied with.
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as many local Muslims, whil e the Maharaja's Hindu
police looked the other way .
3. O n October 4 th as streams of hapless
H indu, Muslim and Sikh refugees struggled to barely
surviv al and Hari Si ngh's predicament grew deeper, a
secular and anti-feudal group, appalled at the Maharaja's
agreement with Pak istan , fo unded a Prov ision a l
Peoples' Repub li c of Jammu and Kas hmir . T his
independent repub lic, headed by G hul am Nabi G il kar
lasted just 20 day s however, losing control to proPakistani elements on October 24.
4. On 25 th October several thousand Pashtun
(mostly Afridi) tribesmen, organized by the Chief
Minister of the North West Frontier Province and led by
a few form er Indian National Army officers, now
integrated into the Pakistani arm y, and by a handful of
Western mercenari es inv aded the Kas hmi r Valley,
ostensibly on a mission to free Kas hmi ri Muslims from
"the Hindu yoke" . Leaving a trail of murder, rape,
plunder and arson among these very Muslims, they
advanced up to about 50 km. of Srinagar.
With his small army routed, the Maharaja called for
Indian help. India made Kashmir's accession to the
Indian Union a condition. On 26th October 1947 Hari
Singh signed the Instrument of Accession and the
following day Indian troops landed in Srinagar. India and
Pakistan fought their first war over Kashm ir .
Meanwhile the Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front
(JKLF) formed with the aim of freeing Kashmir from
both Indian and Pakistani rule. When Kas hmiris today
speak of "regaining freedom", they refer to the rather
technical freedom of 73 days (from August till October
1947), which followed on 358 years of absorption
consecutively into the Mughal empire, the Afghan,
Sikh and Dogra kingdoms, and finally the British
empire.
The finality of Jammu and Kas hmir's accession to
India was, however, unmistakably conditional to
ascertaining the peoples' wishes. India took the stand
that the people, not a feudal ruler, should decide, and
that such a decision, irrespective of whether it was based
on religious or other criteria, must be binding. In
Jammu and Kashmir the peoples' wishes could not be
ascertained at the time, so the ruler's wishes were
accepted temporarily. India thus accepted Hari S ingh' s
decision as tentative, to be confirmed or rev ised by
ascertaining the wishes of the people of Kashmir
through a plebiscite. Various arguments and opinions
have been put forward regarding this promised plebiscite
under UN auspices; it suffices here to note that it has
not been held. Following the United Nations cease-fire
declaration in 1949 Jammu and Kas hmir were split in
two parts: roughly 65% to the east and south of the
cease-fire line controlled by Indi a and roughly 35% to
the west and north of it contro lled by Pakistan, which
later ceded a small portion to Ch ina. T he portion under
indirect or direct Pakistani contro l consists of Azad
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Kashmir and Northern Areas, inhabited mostly by nonKashmiri Sunni Muslims, with Shias in pockets. The
portion under Indian control consists of three areas- (a)
the Kashmir Valley, inhabited overwhelmingly by
Kashmiris (largely Sunni, with Shia and Hindu
minorities), but also by a variety of non-Kashmiri
Sunni (Gujar, Pathan, Punjabi, etc.) and Sikhs; (b) the
area to the south of it peopled by various mostly Hindu
communities and many Sikhs, but also with a very
strong non-Kashmiri Muslim minority (Gujar,6 Rajput,
etc.) and pockets of Kashmiri Sunni; (c) Ladakh (cf.
Rizvi 1996 for an overview).

A 'New Kashmir', Contradictions and
Conflict
Between 1949 and 1953 the movement for social
justice continued. With the abolition of feudal rule, land
reforms were the first major step taken by the N C
government under Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah as
Prime Minister of Jammu and Kashmir. Other sweeping
reforms that he undertook in trying to build a "New
Kashmir" (Naya Kashmir) in the fields of taxation and
education also went down very well with most
Kashmiris, who were unspeakably poor. But they
antagonized wealthy Hindus and
Muslims, who
found their positions of socio-economic power
increasingly threatened. Especially the land reforms
which vastly benefited the rural masses-mostly
Muslims in the Valley and lower-caste Hindus to the
south of it -generated much discontent among the rural
gentry of both religions. In the towns the N C 's
popularity remained high, largely because of Abdullah's
adherence to the charter of kashmiriyat. The articulation
of opposition to Abdullah and his policies was hence
limited, and could not be couched in the idiom of social
justice. Since, however, Abdullah was unequivocally
secular, opposition could be couched in terms of
religion-be this Islam or Hinduism. As mentioned
earlier, politics and religion did not traditionally mix
well in the Valley, but they certainly did to the south of
it. With Partition, while Islamic influence decreased,
that of Hindu organizations increased. While in the
Valley people waited impatiently for the promised
plebiscite to finally decide the future of Jammu and
Kashmir, to the south, in the name of Indian
nationalism the virulently communal and socially
obscurantist Praja Parishad and the fascist Rashtriya
Swayam Sevak Sangh (RSS) whipped up fear among
Hindus and Sikhs about renewed atrocities by Muslims,
were a plebiscite to take place. They built up a plank
against self-determination for the region, equating all
demands for self-determination with a demand for a
Muslim state.

6Another allied community, the Bakkarwal, migrate
annually with their herds between the Valley and the areas
south of it and even go into Ladakh (Casimir and Rao 1998,
Rao 1995, 1998).
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Largely to pacify these elements who wer"e ga ining
influence in the central government the so-called "Delhi
Agreement" was signed in July 1952. It spelled out the
mutual limits of authority of the Kas hmiri and Indian
states and reneged on the promised plebiscite.
Essentially, therefore, it ignored the principles of
democracy and justice and denied the ethos of
kashmiriyat; it was never accepted by th e majority of
the Valley's population, and Sheikh Abdullah now
started speaking more openly of "self-determination" and
"full autonomy". All vestiges of democracy were finally
shed in 1953 with his dismissal by the Indian
government on August 3th and with his arrest and
incarceration on charges of treason till 1968.

Co-opting and the Lure of Money: The 1960s
and 1970s
While the new government ruled with Indian help ,
those who had been in favor of Abdullah joined together
with many who had increasingly opposed him for his
own undemocratic ways to form the Plebiscite Front in
1958 . It is widely opined that this is when many
Kashmiris first started looking to Pakistan for
sympathy. With Abdullah's arrest and the threat of an
intensified movement towards both social justice and
self-determination looming large, India adopted a new
double-pronged policy of co-opting potential
opponents? and their families economically while
crushing dissent.

Co-option
Given its small population, the Valley had a very
dense structure of cross-cutting ties between trade,
officialdom,
artisanship,
cash
crop
agriculture/horticulture-and politics. Hence, not only
those who favored independence, but even those who
felt that Kashmir should be part of Pakistan, and these
included many among the Muslim landed gentry and the
urban mercantile class, were-as individuals and
families-part of these networks. These opponents of
the government were now co-opted into the system of
economic benefits, primarily through the subsidies
provided by India8. The result was massive corruption,
to which, however, little moral opprobrium attached,
since the money that flowed in was considered "Indian
money". This policy led to the emergence of a middle
class which could not afford to be openly anti-India,
while participating in a sullen but peaceful opposition
to Indian rule. How passive this opposition was is
evident from the meager response in 1965, during the
second Pakistan-India war, to Pakistan's call to
7rncidentally, Abdullah and Nehru had proceeded in this
manner a few years earlier faced with the Ladakhi demand
for self-determination (van Beek 1998: 39).
8 While in 1950-51 only 3.7% of the revenue was
contributed by India, by 1970-71 this had risen to over
56.29%-and was to rise further to 72% by the end of the
1980s (cf. Ganguly 1997: 74, Tab. 4.1).
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Muslims not to collaborate with Indian troops 9 . It was
this same middle class which played a key role in the
late 1980s and early 1990s, first in electoral opposition
and then in the armed struggle.
Economic ga ins went hand in hand with political
power and this in tum was now increasingly based on
communi ty -spec if ic sentiments. Till 1947 influenti al
men of all communities had acted as mediators and
middlemen between their respective communities and
other larger units at various levels of the socio-political
hierarchy. With the advent of the electoral system these
middlemen gradually became leaders of "vote banks".
These functioned as vertical chains of patrons and
clients , integrated into networks composed of these
patrons, local politicians and a variety of men who
made their money from various not entirely legal
activities and acted as what Srinivas and Beteille
( 1964: 167) have in another context termed
"contractors". Cutting across such localized networks
the wealthy and po li tically ambitious and influential
now increasingly formed interest groups which could,
however, function on the broader platform of regional
politics only by projecting themselves and being
projected in terms of community allegiance. Right from
the start in post-colonial South Asia, collective identity
couched in "cultural" terms was blatantly used for
electoral purposes. In India " ... caste form[ed] an
important criterion in the selection of candidates ... "
(Rao and Rao 1974: 454-55), so also did religion, while
in Pakistan sectarian and tribal affiliations were
exploited (Orywal 1Y98). Inevitably then, especially
from the late 1960s when politics in India came to be
conce ived of increasingly ".. . as essentially an electoral
game" (Kothari 1985: 5) " .. . the numbers game
essentially became an ethnic game" (Kothari 1985: 7).
In this "game" in Jammu and Kashmir also both
religious feelings and affiliations and non-religious
cultural traditions were used to make and break the rules
and all political parties tried to determine the players.
The emergence of "vote banks" led to economic
resources being converted into political resources and
finally, a clear consensus being created between
economic power within the community and political
representation in the wider framework by using sets of
cultural features to temporarily create political
affiliation . All this took place in a political context in
which every Muslim resident of the region was expected
to "prove" his allegiance and loyalty to a state which
was increasingly demanding monolithic identities and
affiliations and rewarding these by greater access to a
network of resources.
Economic gains had percolated down to the villages,
as was evident from vast improvement in food

9The existence of resentment is clear from the fact that
among those who did help Pakistan were the sons of
certain middle class families - and that some of these very
men are long back in positions of administrative power in
Kashmir.
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availability, clothing and communication. Yet, wi th
population growth and few new e mployme nt
opportunities in the countryside mi gration to urban
areas continued and the number of unemployed , res tive
youth grew. G iv en the gov ernme nt's pro gres siv e
education policy, very many of these young men had
higher formal education and considered themselves to be
highly quali fiedlo. Jobs were, however, limited: there
was no local industry worth the name, Indian industry
could not and did not invest in Kashmir, Kashmi ri
Musl ims did not like to leave the Valley to take up jobs
elsewhere, and finally, they felt discriminated against in
recruitment to the "central (Indian) services".

Crushing Diss ent
While at the day to day level, corruption,
inefficiency and the machinations of the governments in
Srinagar and Delhi effectively placed issues of social
justice on a back burner, all organized political
opposition was muffled and draconian laws were
promulgated to deter it. Not only was Maqbool Butt,
one of the major leaders of the JKLF hanged 11 • but
local opposition parties were banned or intensely
harassed, and even Indian parties opposed to Congress
rule in Delhi-such as the left of center Praja Socialist
Party-were prevented from putting up candidates. Most
later participants in the armed insurgency of the 1990s
were arrested as teenagers for demonstrating, pelting
stones at Government agencies, shouting "anti-Indian"
or "pro-Pakistani" slogans. Hundreds of such young
mostly working-class Kashmiri Muslims used to be
almost routinely arrested, manhandled and humiliated.
Especially in northern Kashmir youngsters were picked
up as suspected spies and tortured (pers. comm. of an
Indian security officer, 1988). A later General Secretary
of the JKLF recalled: "While still in school I joined AlFatah, a pro-independence group, which simply wanted
to remind both India and Pakistan, peacefully, [about
the plebiscite]. I was arrested for the first time in 1971.
I was 18 and spent nearly six months under
interrogation; we were forced to remain stark naked,
while our persecutors joked about our circumcised
penis" (interview published in a Srinagar newspaper,
1990). In the aftermath of the 1965 Indo-Pakistan war
many Gujar and Bakkarwalliving near the Indo-Pakistan
cease-fire-line south of the Kashmir Valley were killed
and hundreds had to flee westwards into Azad Kashmir
when their huts were torched by Indian army personnel,
on mere suspicion of collaboration with Pakistan (pers.

~~here was a tremendous growth in literacy rates between
1961 and 1981 and an equally dramatic jump in higher
education (cf. figures in Ganguly 1997: 32-34, Tab. 2.1 2.3; these figures do not, however, distinguish between the
Valley and other parts of Jammu and Kashmir).
II He was sentenced for murder in 1968, broke jail in 1969
and was rearrested and then hanged in1984 largely in
retaliation for the murder of an Indian diplomat by another
JKLF member in Britain.
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comm. of several eye-witnesses and of M.M. Khajuria,
later Director General Police, Jammu and Kashmir).
By the mid 1960s the idea of Kashmiri nationalist
resistance had grown with the impact of events outside
South Asia, such as the successful Algerian fight
against French colonialism, the Vietnam war and the
P alestinian struggle. But it was above all the continued
harassment, persecution and complete suppression of
basic democratic rights of all Kashmiri Muslims who
dared to openly air their opposition to the doings of
those in power which became the driving force of this
resistance.
In 1972, one year after the third Indo-Pakistan war
and the formation of Bangladesh, India and Pakistan
signed the "Simla Accord", thus officially retracting on
the promised plebiscite and explicitly blending out the
wishes of the people of Kashmir. In the same year
while members of the largely secular Plebiscite Front
were arrested and debarred from standing for elections,
the orthodox Jama'at-e Is/ami (JJ) 12 was ensured a
victory against the NC in five seats by the Congress,
which declared itself a winner in 57 of the 74 seats .
Apparently the notions of kashmiriyat and selfdetermination were perceived as more dangerous to
Indian rule than Islamic fundamentalism. Politically the
JJ remained weak and even in 1977, in the first and last
fair and free e lections in Jammu and Kashmir it won
only one seat. But it was working so lidly in the rural
areas with the help of fundamentalist preachers brought
in from Bihar and after the horrendous massacre of
Muslims at Nellie, from Assam. In rural areas many
parents sent their children to schools run by the JJ,
since State-run schools often existed only on paper.
Banned in 1975 by Sheikh Abdullah who was once
again in power by now, these schools openly inculcated
fundamentalist Islam and hatred and contempt of
Hindus. The emotive appeal of Islam was growing and
increasingly even the NC thought it expedient to appeal
to Islamic, and even pro-Pakistani sentiments in its
election campaigns. Two major reason for the growing
political appeal of religion should be mentioned: with
Sheikh Abdullah's release and re-election people had
looked forward to a relief from oppression, but this was
not to be. With the Jammu and Kashmir Safety
Ordinance and the Public Safety Bill in 1977 and 1978
respectively the government severely curtailed press
12The JJ in Kashmir is ideologically close to the prePartition J I founded in 1941 by Maulana Abu! Ala

Maudoodi, who advocated the idea of Nizam-e Mustafa-a
system which he felt would be in tune with what had existed
when the Prophet ruled-and held that Pakistan, tholl;gh a
Muslim state, is yet to become truly Islamic. The parent JJ
split in 1947: The Indian branch came under Deobandi
influence and focussed on Muslim culture, while the
Kashmir branch took on an ambivalent and opportunistic
posture between Pak istan and India. Its current head himself
stood for elections to the Jammu and Kashmir state
assembly several times, but is now the chairman of the

freedom, thereby blocking just about the only
remaining means of expressing disagreeme nt. Secondly ,
all hopes pinned on Abdullah died, as he turned out thi s
time to be e ve n less democ rati c tha n before , and in
addition ne poti sti c and corrupt. As a res ult , sec ul ar
ideals were inc reas ing ly question ed- to m a ny Is lam
offered an alternative set of ideals.

P r elud e t o Armed Militancy -

The 1980s

The developments in the previous phase impac ted
different communities and sections in Kashmi r
differently, but the y all revolved a round the access to
resources, the perception of which was also c han ging
rapidly. The late 1970s and 1980s witnessed increasing
migration among profess ional Muslims to the Gulf
countries and to the West. The resulting remittance
economy created a nouveau riche section of Kashmiri
Muslims whose opulent life style was disapproved of
by large sections of the conservative urban working and
lower-middle classes, most of whom had at least some
forma l education. Many of these nouveau riche were
employed in that section of the Sri nagar tourist industry
which catered to W estern tourists. For this entire
portion of primarily Srinagar-based, Kashmiri Muslim
society, the role models were non-Indian, and contempt
for things Indian increasingly and necessarily came to
pair with resentment and mistrust. The ready cash
available a lso led to a great deal of land speculation and
a rapid spread of urbanization. While socio-economic
disparities among Mus lims and discontent grew, the
Muslim middle and upper classes, firmly entrenched in
positions of economic power, asp ired to g reater political
power.
Ind ian reaction now changed from appropriation to
open confrontation. The Congress in Delhi, with its
intensely undemocratic and divide and rule policies
towards all non-Congress ruled areas, encouraged local
fissile tendencies and used these for electoral gains. In
Jammu and Kashmir, ruled by the NC with a primarily
Kashmiri backing, this meant emphasizing differences
between the Kashm iri-linguistically the majority
population in the Valley on the one hand - and all nonKashmiri (primarily the minority -cluster of Gujar,
Bakkarwal and "Pahari "-cf. Rao 1999) as well as
between Muslim and non-Muslim. This in evitably
implied an open attack on the concept of kashmiriyat
which was meant to embrace all commun ities of the
region.
Between 1933t3 and 1986 the Valley had witnessed
no communal riots, not even during the P artition of

APHC.

I3Jn 1932 Srinagar witnessed riots between Kashmiri
Muslims and Kas hmiri Hindus and "many pandit famili es
migrated to Sri nagar from the villages" (Tim es of India ,
September 26, 1932). During one of the hearings of the
·Glancy Commission a Gujar had testified that when he went
to sell milk in a Hindu home he had been allacked; another
witness said how he had seen three Gujar being dragged to a
temple by Hindus and then killed (KRC 1932: 43 , 46).
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1947; yet, ever since the Mughal Emperor Shah Jehan's
time an uneasy co-existence had characterized MuslimH indu relations. With hi s decree prohibiting
intermarriage between the two communities, common
till then, soc ial intercourse was greatly red uced. Now
three hundred years later in public speec hes Indian
po liti c ians, including Indi ra Gandhi , harped on the
re li g iou s differences between Kas hmiri Muslims and
H indu s. Increasingly thereafter Kas hmiri Muslims
began to be exc luded from key posts in the local
administration and the savage massacre of Hindus in
1986, engineered it is widely fe lt by the Congress, was
probably part of this policy of driving the wedge deeper
be tw ee n the variou s co mmunities. An overall
atmosphere of great mi strust between urbanized
Muslims and Hindus developed . The latter were being
increasingly viewed by the former as pro-Congress,
hence pro-India and by the same token anti-Kashmir.
Unquest ionably, Pakistani propaganda echoed this
theme and fueled these sentiments. Educated Hindus, in
their turn, began to feel threatened by Muslims and even
discriminated against by the government of Jammu and
Kas hmir; many began to emigrate to India. The
government's reaction to the growing restiveness of
large sections of Kashmiri Muslims was twofold: to
wish it away by interpreting it as "anti-Indian" feelings
created entirely by Pakistan and to counter it by
stimulating the perception of threat among Kashmiri
Hindus. This process led slowly but steadily to
Kashmiri identity becoming synonymous with
Kashmiri Muslim identity .
Kashmiris, whatever their faith, increasingly tended
to try and find solace in rather fundamentalist forms of
their respective religions, and a population which was
still aware of its largely joint cultural identity grew
increasingly conscious of the only part of this identity
whic h was potentially divisive-religious identity.
Recalling Gellner's observation (1981), a conflict which
was basically between the haves and the have-nots got
channeled, not into class conflict, but into a conflict
that was interpreted in "ethnic" and "religious" terms.
While Islamic fundamentalist organizations, largely
abetted and funded by Pakistan's Inter Services
Intellig ence (IS/), tutored and preached orthodox and
often downri ght fundamentalist Islam, their Hindu
counterparts tried to inculcate monolithic "Hinduism".
In the years that followed, the invasion of Afghanistan
by the Soviets ("India" s friend") 14 , their subsequent
defeat the re, the Iranian revolution, the rise of the
Central Asian republics with their Muslim populations
and nearer home the S ikh movement for K halistan
14T he fact that India did not condemn this invasion also
had far reaching consequences for Kashmir. Condemning
India for its stand, the Afghan Taleban, for example, have
till recently been supporting and imparting military
training to men of the Harkat-ul Ansar (see Note 17 below).
It is rumored, however, that clan-oriented/ideological
splits within the Taleban 9which was never as homogenous
as made out to be) are impac ting this support.
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encouraged Kas hmiri Muslims to increasingly conceive
of politics and nationalism in general and their own
empowerment in particular in terms Islam. An exactly
parallel movement went on, especially to the south of
the Valley, where the equally obscurantist and fanatic
forces of the Vishwa Hindu Parishad and the Bharatiya
Janata Party instilled and incited hatred and contempt
among H indus , in the name of a new nationalism.
Consciously and for political purposes, several streams
of identity and affiliation were thus being rejuvenated,
created, stimulated or strengthened-Kashmiri vs. nonKashmiri, Muslim vs. Hindu, etc. In the midst of all
these "cultural" issues what never got mentioned in
public political discourse were the issues of growing
economic stratification and of political power being
increasingly perce ived almost entirely as an incomegenerating resource for individuals and small groups
who had access to it.
Increasingly the younger generation felt that the
older struggle led by the NC had not palpably liberated
the people from repressive structures and brought them
social justicels. With the NC after Sheikh Abdullah's
death giving in unabashedly to blackmail and terror by
the Congress in Delhi, most Kashmiri Muslims looked
in vain for an alternative. But armed militancy was still
a far cry. As a later JKLF Commander recalled, "In
1982 we first distributed cassettes of Maqbool Butt
together with some movies of guerrilla warfare and war
in Afghanistan, but the response was very poor. Even
in 1987-1988 when we again tried to contact youth
... we had just ten to fifteen guns, but [there was] no
response. We were given the treatment of untouchables,
nobody was sympathetic" (Interview published in a
Srinagar newspaper in 1990).

A Decade of Armed Violence
The fraudulent elections of 1987 dealt the final blow
to non -militant politics. When the Muslim United
Front (MUF), a conglomeration of opposition groups
for which some 60% Kashmiris cast their vote was
declared defeated, most Kashmiri Muslims felt that
parliamentary opposition had no chance, that justice
was unattainable without "self-determination" and
separation from India. Waves of strikes, assassinations,
bomb blasts, kidnappings and arson hit the Valley,
peaking in 1990. The components of the MUF formed
militant wings (A/ Barq, AI Fateh, AI Jehad, etc.), with
ISHence many militant organisations tried to ban the
government celebration of July 13 as Martyrs' Day, which
used to commemorate all those who died in the struggle
against the Dogra cum colonial regime. In recent years, the
APHC has tried to co-opt this ritual by holding parallel
celebrations. Rejection of the older struggle was also
manifested in attempts to desecrate Sheikh Abdullah's
grave and in threats issued to elderly Kashmiri Muslims
who had participated in that movement to face the
consequences if they did not return the awards and pensions
they received from the government in recognition of their
earlier involvement.
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weapons that were, not surprisingly, funded almost
entirely by Pakistan's IS/. Thousands of youth took up
arms in order, as one of them says, to "convey to the
conscience of the world, and to Indian conscience in
particular, that we Kashmiri people want to be heard"
(Malik 1998). The first of these grew into the armed
wing of the J KLF, which began by recruiting four
young men (the so-called HAJY group) as the first
batch of trainees. The armed youth trained by the IS/,
belonged to urban families who had not managed to
penetrate the existing economic networks; they were
potentially dangerous, not only to the Indian state, but
also to the economic fabric of Kashmir. There was
growing potential for a violent movement in search of
not just political but also socio-economic justice, a
movement based not on religious, or ethnic allegiances,
but on contesting the appropriation of resources by a
chosen few.
While the /S/ trained and armed them, these young
men proclaimed that the duty of every Kashmiri was to
fight a jehad for social and political justice. This
justified extortion, kidnappings, forcible entry into
Muslim homes, and even torture; for if one was not
ready to take up arms, or give one's son or younger
brother to the armed movement, one should at least
pay 16. Road blocks to collect "donations" for a variety
of militia (many gave receipts) or for a local mosque
were the order of the day. All this led to resentment
among wealthy Muslims, many of whom began to
leave the Valley and stay in India or in the West. It also
ultimately led to numerous factions and even gun
battles within and between the militia. The overall
result was an atmosphere of intense fear and a collapse
of the productive part of the economy. Yet there was no
shortage of cash. Apart from Indian subsidies which
continued unabated, with every call by the militants for
a strike-and these were very frequent-shop owners
and tradesmen were compensated, as they still are, by
IS/ funds.
Aspiring to political power, the Muslim middle
class had little choice but to support the insurgents, and
internal socio-economic contradictions were set aside,
first in the name of kashmiriyat and then, following the
principle of fitna, in the name of Islam. The call for
jehad did, very briefly, bring together Islamism and
kashmiriyat, till then perceived as incompatible, but it
also augured the death-knell of kashmiriyat. The call
blared forth at night from numerous mosques in
December 1990, coupled with some brutal killings of
Kashmiri Hindus, threats at gun point to many others,
and a clear Indian campaign to depict the entire issue as
a Muslim-Hindu conflict terrified the vast' majority of
Kashmiri Hindus into accepting Indian help to·flee the
16Butchers, grocers, etc. who traditionally kept monthly or
even seasonal accounts of their customers' dues were
favoured sources of information regarding a household's
consumption patterns and hence also about _its income and
other features.
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Valley and live in squalor and misery to the south . With
their exodus- or "mi gration" as it is ambiguously
referred to in official pa rlanc e -the c once pt of
kas hmiriyat died. Another reason fo r its de mise was that
Srinagar was also largely populated by wealthy Muslim
Punjabis-, many of whom fa voured accession to
Pakistan, rath e r th a n ind e p e nd e nce . T o th e m
kashmiriyat m eant littl e . A thi rd factor was t hat
increasingly, powe r within the milita nt g roups was
slipping into the hands of peopl e from outside the
Valley (mostly Azad Kashmiris) who were not
culturally Kashmiri; finally , for reasons of historica l
and political expedienc y all g roups continued to claim
to fight for the whole of Jammu and Kashmir, not just
the Valley-in other words also for the non-Kashmiri
populations (cf. Puri 1987: 836, Rao 1999). The
culturally binding force could then only be Islam. Last,
but not least, the mystically-oriented Islam typical for
the Valley and part and parcel of kashmiriyat was
frowned upon by the IS/ and most of the other funding
agencies. In 1990 this aspect of kashmiriyat had been
used by the J KLF when, in the presence of some
300,000 people, their leaders vowed at the shrine of
Nur-ud Din, known to Muslims as Alamdar-e Kashmir
and to Hindus as Nand Rishi, to lead Kashmir to
independence. In May 1995 this sufi shrine was largely
destroyed in fighting between Indian troops and Harkat ul Ansar l7 militants, who had placed bombs within the
shrine 18 .
Gradually then, the term kashmiriyat was dropped
from the official discourse of the insurgents and more
militant Islamic terminology (e .g. jehad, mujahid,
shahid, Nizam-e Mustafa ) took its place. Conservative
religious practices also increased, though attempts to
compel women to veil, men to attend Friday prayers,
wear beards and ban smoking failed. Numerous West
Asian style mosques (as opposed to local Kashmiri
styles) sprang up, women's hair dressing saloons, girls'
schools and cinema houses were forcibly closed,
women's colleges burned, and bands of armed young

17This pan-Islamic militant organisation was formed
between 1991 and 1993 with the merging of the Pakistani
Harkat -ul Jehad-a/lslami (set up in 1980 by the Jama'at-e
Ulema lslami- a virulent opponent of the 11- first as an
aid group for Afghan refugees in Pakistan and then to
recruit and train youth to fight the communist government
in Afghanistan) and the Tehrik-ul Mujahidin. It does not
recognise territorial frontiers dividing Muslims and was
officially declared a "terrorist group" by the USA due to its
alleged involvement in the World Trade Centre bombings;
to facilitate continuing financial transactions it has since
renamed itself Harkat-ul Mujahidin .In an attempt to
pressurize India to release Masud Azhar*, one of its main
ideologues, who was arrested in February 1994 while
illegally crossing into Kashmir, one of its sub-groups, AIFaran, kidnapped and held hostage six Western tourists in
1995; it is believed that most of them were killed.
18since 1991 at least thirteen Muslim shrines in the
Kashmir Valley have been attacked and even destroyed.
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men combed the lanes and bye-lanes to check on proper
behaviour.
From 1990 onwards, while subjecting Srinagar to
more th an 100 days of uninterrupted curfew, India
brou ght in some 400,000 military and paramilitary
forces, who not only engaged the militants in open
battle, but shot all su spects point blank and resorted to
most brutal physical and psychological repression .
Armed with supreme powers these forces indulged in
unspeakable atrocities and humans rights violations,
· which have been documented by many independent
Indian and international organizations, including
Amnesty International (e.g. Asia Watch 1991, IPT
1997, Rao 1991 ). In the following years most of the
Valley's 1.5 million Muslim families grieved over
some member killed, tortured, or raped; thousands were
detained without trial, thousands disappeared without a
trace . Hundreds of houses were plundered during "search
operations" and "crack downs", innumerable families
faced blackmail, extortion, and humiliation.
Islamic militia too were on the ascendant from 1990
onwards, when the anti-Soviet Afghan leader Gulbuddin
Hekmatyar called for jehad against India on August
14th, and by 1993 the issue of independence got further
complicated with the JKLF, with secular claims being
increasingly overshadowed both in military and financial
might by groups intimately connected to Islamic
fundamentalist groups. Notable among these was the
Hi zb-ul Mujahidin (H M), the armed wing of the
lama' at -e Is/ami, which is ideologically close to
Pakistan. Unlike the JKLF who aim at the independence
of the whole of Kashmir from both India and Pakistan,
when HM members spoke of independence they meant
joining Azad Kashmir, which is nominally independent
(azad) but de facto a part of Pakistan (e.g. Kreutzmann
1996: 243). Also unlike JKLF activists, who are
predominantly urban, those of the HM are largely rural,
or at least have strong rural connections. Perhaps
realizing that the grip of the JKLF was fast slipping,
Amanullah Khan, one of its founders, tried in June
1990, amidst most brutal state repression, to form a
shadow cabinet for an independent state of Jammu and
Kashmir. He invited not just Kashmiri, not just
Muslims, but also the son of the last Dogra Maharaja
to join. Within the Valley a handful of urban Hindus
had also been members or sympathizers of the JKLF;
their roughly 300, 000 members in Western countries
included Mirpuri, Kashmiri, Gujar and people of several
other communities mainly from Azad Kashmir.
Amanullah's efforts met with little positive response;
instead there arose over the next few months a plethora
of armed groups: Allah Tigers, AI-Umar Mujahidin*,
Hi zhullah, Jkhwan -ul Mujahidin, lkhwan-ul Muslimin,
etc. With arms and money flowing in, internecine shoot
outs and even mutually inflicted torture and murder in
the Valley grew out of proportion. In May 1990 the
H M shot and killed the then Mirwaiz of Kashmir,
because he opposed accession to Pakistan; later in a
show of strength it vied with the JKLF in occupying
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the Hazratbal mosque, one of Srinagar's major mosques.
By 1993, several non -Kashmi r i Muslims from
Afghanistan, Sudan, Palestine and Yeme n owin g
allegi ance to the Harkat-ul Ansar had entered the scene,
and the JKLF- which still spoke of independence,
rather than accession to Pakistan- had stopped receiving
Pakistani help. Yet its members continued to refer to
the portion under Pakistani control as "free Kas hmir"
(A zad Kashmir) and that under Indian control as
"occupied Kashmir" (Maqbu za Kashmir) . This
terminology is still in use. By 1996 higher rates of
service and compensation were being paid to the nonKashmiri militants and their families than to Kashmiris
who had largely earned themselves the reputation of
being less committed fighters.
While the families of many militants- irrespective
of group allegiance- fled to Pakistan, middle-class
families increasingly emigrated, caught between the
Indian forces and the insurgents. The less wealthy went
to India, the wealthier to the West, to Cyprus, etc. With
schools and colleges hardly functioning- a large
percentage of the teachers had been Hindus- Kashmiri
Muslim children went to study in India, and with the
exodus of Hindu doctors increasingly Muslims who
could afford it also went to India for treatment (and till
today Y as in Malik, the JKLF head, is regularly attended
to by a Kashmiri Hindu doctor in Delhi).
After Pakistani financial help to the JKLF ceased in
favour of the HM the former became a prime target of
the latter, and to survive it declared a unilateral cease-fire
in 1994. This led to greater peace in the Valley, but
also to yet another split within the JKLF, with many of
its men continuing to fight under the auspices of other
organizations (currently the Harkat-ul Ansar or the
Lashkar-e Toiba 19). Soon after, to curb militant infighting many militant and opposition groups joined to
form a common platform, the All Parties Hurriyat
Conference (APHC ), with the objective of pressing for
a plebiscite. Whatever its popular image may be 20 this
19This is a wing of the Jama'at-e Ahi-e Haditlz and is
closely linked to the Markaz-ul Dawa-u/lrshad. The latter
was founded in 1987. Funded by Pakistan, its members are
trained by the IS/ in Afghanistan (in camps near Khost),
Pakistan and Azad Kashmir (in camps near Kotli and
Muzaffarabad).
20-rhe APHC has earned itself the reputation of being
extremely corrupt, and its major leaders-many of whom
stood for elections in earlier years, even as Congress
candidates-of having ill-gotten wealth. While most of
this money comes in from Pakistan, some comes from Iran,
as in the case of Abbas Ansari, a Shia leader, and a great
deal comes from Kashmiri (and Azad Kashmiri) diasporas in
the West and Middle East. When the first round of IndoPakistan talks began in 1998 and many Kashmiris
demanded that their representatives be allowed to
participate, Pakistan said it would speak on their behalf.
Pro-independence protests in Kashmir was muffled and a
complete strike prevented by the APHC, which in return
received a large pay-off from Pakistan. While the IS/ and
other Pakistani organizations campaign for the APHC both
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demonstrates that there are no clear lines between
"fundamentalist" and "non-fundamentalist" groupssimply shades of grey, that represent varying strategies
based on different aspects and degrees of faith and
desperate atte mpts to fulfill personal commitments to
principles of specifically Islamic justice. These are the
very princ ipl es tha t are instrume ntalised by a variety of
orga nizations and institutions- the 11, the lUI, the IS/
- to fight their own battles.

Conclusion: The Simmering Volcano
A decade of brutal state repression, violent resistance
and massive foreign interference have left a deep mark
on every section of the increasingly fractured social
fabric of the whole of Jammu and Kashmir. Continuing
with its policy of divide and rule, the government
recruited Kashmiri Hindus as translators/interpreters in
interrogation cells and members of various nonKashmiri Muslim communities either as informers or
as members of armed counter-gangs (e.g. Vinayak 1994;
Sidhva 1995).2 1 Individual Gujar were also recruited to
help the government plan the elections of 1996 in
Jammu and Kashmir, in which, it is now generally
accepted, the people were physically forced to vote (e.g.
Balagopal et al. 1996). But the extent to which even the
seemingly united Kashmiri Muslim society in the
Valley has been impacted is clear from the frequency
with which Indian security forces have been called upon
by individual Kashmiris to intervene, threaten and
harass fellow Kashmiris with whom they have some
personal score to settle. The massive deployment of 'exmilitants'22 or 'counter-insurgents' as members of the
government's Special Task Force and Special Operation
Group licensed to raid any house, pick up anybody for
interrogation and even summarily kill anyone suspected
of being anti-government is partly possible due to this
social rupture and is also exacerbating it. Pakistan's role
as savior has increasingly been questioned, and many
young militant leaders are no longer heroes, as is

evident from the problems they are having in findin g
suitable wives . However, all this does not mean that
any section of the population of Jammu and Kashmir
merges its identity with that of the Indi an state ; India is
hated, as perhaps never before.
As of writing , the Indo-Paki s ta n war in Ka rg il is
over and fr esh elections are due in Septe m be r 1999 ,
with the National Conference , the Congr ess, a ne w
party the Peoples' Democratic Party and other sm alle r
parties joining the fray; the APHC has, predictabl y,
called for a boycott, though there are strong rumours
that there is much disagreement about this within their
ranks (there were certainly many in the JKLF who
wanted to participate in the 1998 elections but were
overruled by the leadership). In the last elections in
Jammu and Kashmir in 1998, where people voted much
more voluntarily than in 1996, the official battle lines
were drawn between the National Conference on the one
hand and various other parties on the other. Electoral
tactics seemed a complex mixture of attempts at access
to resources, preservation of identity and basic survival.
A Kashmiri Muslim, Abdul Rashid Kabli, contested
from Srinagar as a candidate of the Bharatiya Janata
Party (BJP) which openly represents communalist
Hindu sentiments, while another Kashmiri Muslim ,
Deen Mohammad Cheeta, formerly of the National
Conference, who left the Valley a few years ago for
Jammu was also the BJP's candidate from Baramulla. In
other parallel developments the BJP had successfully
recruited ex-militant Kashmiri Muslims in the Valley
who, it is said, were refused tickets by the National
Conference because of their unusually brutal past 23 ; the
JKLF also claimed to have received in its folds a couple
of ex-BJP members in the Jammu region .
There are few open battles now in the Valley, but
draconian laws (e.g. Ronga 1999), indiscriminate
killings, torture and rape continue, as do attacks by
militants (roughly 60% pan-Islamic and non-Kashmiri)
on military and other government installations and cash
flows and propaganda from Pakistan. India and Pakistan
are apparently still not convinced that there can be no
military solution to 'the Kashmir Problem'. In India,
even those who condemn human rights violations by
the state rarely conceive of the Valley's separation from
India, and especially after the Kargil war few are critical
of the Indian forces, not only for their brutality, but
also for their massive corruption (timber trade, pay offs
for supplies, rumored sale of ammunition, etc., to
militants, etc.). The legal system has practically
collapsed and very few of those incarcerated for years
have been put on trial; even those who have been tried

locally and internationally (e.g. through numerous internet
sites), it should be noted that the APHC is neither
homogenous, nor do all its constituents fovor joining
Pakistan.
2tTwo major such outfits are composed of Gujar. One, the
Talihan (not to be confused with those of Afghanistan),
originally formed by a major Gujar politician to protect
himself and his family from attacks by anti-India militants
and living off smuggling timber, operates mainly in
tandem with the Rashtriya Rifles, an unit of the Indian
security forces. The second such outfit, the Muslim
Liberation Army, is known to be close to the Congress.
Both groups are very at:tive in identifying and suppressing
all anti-government activities.
2 2These ex-militants subscribe to no particular ideology
and had either surrendered or deserted their respective
groups because of pecuniary considerations or prolonged
inter-group fighting . Many Kasmiris also say that some of
these men are members of the NC, who were recruited by
Indian Intelligence agencies to penetrate militant networks
and even sent to Pakstan for military training.

23These are men who first belonged to the militant outfit
lklnvan -ul Muslimin under the leadership of the dreaded
Yusuf ("Kuka") Parray and were then recruited by the
· government as "counter gangs" (e.g. Sidhva I 995) or
"counter insurgents"; they have now formed the A wami
League which was supported by the 81 P in the elections of
1998.
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and found innocent have been rearrested on fresh
charges . The Kas hmir Government c laims that
"normalcy" has been largely restored, and indeed, on the
surface it has-this time with the active and brutal help
of rural ex -militants and with enormous sums of cash
doled out by India as pay-offs to powerful individuals,
groups and even entire villages.

C.S. 1914a Letter from the Rev enue Minister, His
Highness, the Maharaja Sahib Bahadur, Jammu and
Kashmir State, Srinagar to the Chief Minister, Jammu and
Kashmir State, Sri nagar, dated, the I Oth of September,
1914 (Liability of Bakarwa ls crossing over to Gilgit to sell
sheep and goats to the Supply and Transport Dept., Gi lgit).
Jarrimu: Jammu Archives, C.S. Old Records, File No.
221 /A-9 of 1914.

In Kashmir there is a grow ing sense of betrayal by
Pakistan, especially after the Kargil withdrawal, and to
maintain cred ibility Pakistan must keep up the pressure.
·Most Kashm iris still speak of their dreams of "selfdetermination" and the estab lishment of a society that is
"in keeping with Islamic values". The definitions of
both terms defy political expediency and regional and
global econom ic and power networks. Terminologically
they symbolize the near impossibility of reconciling the
various idioms that have marked the struggle in
Kashm ir: Islamic values, Kashmiri identity and justice.
Justice in Kas hmir can not be attained along religious
categories, espec ially if the whole of Jammu and
Kashmir is considered. Kashmiriyat and Islam
apparently also do not pair well, nor can a specific
Kashm iri identity be valid for all the communities in
the area2 4 . Till Kashmiri leaders of various political
persuasions have the maturity and honesty to come to
terms with these contradictions and stop simultaneously
blackmailing India and Pakistan while playing into their
hads for short-term benefits, "self-determination" will
for those who hav e known only injustice and
humiliation remain a diffuse, though increasingly
violent longing for a more equitable world.

C.S . 1914b Letter from the Revenue Minister, Jammu
and Kashmir State, Jammu to the Chief Minister Jammu and
Kashmir State, Jammu, dated, the 2 1st June, 1916
(Exclusion of Foreign Bakarwals from Frontier Districts).
Jammu: Jammu Archives, C.S . Old Records, File No .
221/A-9 of 1914.
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